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556 Michigan Law Review 
CONTEMPT-INJUNCTIONS-Federal Civil Contempt 
Decree Orders Deputy Sheriff To Resign From 
Office-Lance v. Plummer* 
[Vol. 65 
During the summer of 1964, a federal district judge issued an in-
junction prohibiting various St. Augustine, Florida organizations 
and other persons with notice of the injunction from harassing or 
intimidating Negroes who were seeking motel or restaurant accom-
modations.1 Appellant Lance, an unpaid volunteer deputy sheriff, 
was not a member of any of the enjoined organizations, but he had 
actual notice of the order. Nonetheless, six days after the injunction 
was issued, he engaged in activities designed to intimidate a Negro 
citizen. 2 In a subsequent civil contempt action arising from these 
activities, the federal district judge, asserting jurisdiction over him 
because of his actual knowledge of the injunction, found appellant 
in contempt. Appellant was not only ordered to pay a small com-
pensatory fee to the complaining party, but, in addition, he was 
compelled to resign his position as deputy sheriff and to cease acting 
under color of authority as a law enforcement officer.3 On appeal to 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, held, affirmed, except that the 
prohibition from acting as a deputy was modified so as to continue 
only until such time as appellant could satisfy the trial court that 
he would thereafter comply with the injunctive order.4 The court 
noted that it could assert jurisdiction over a person acting in concert 
with a class of enjoined defendants and that it has the power to re-
move such a person from public office in order to secure compliance 
with the injunctive order. The Supreme Court denied appellant's 
•- 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965) [hereinafter cited as principal case], cert. denied, 
384 U.S. 929 (1966) (Black and Harlan, JJ., dissenting in separate written opinions) 
[Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion is hereinafter cited as Black's dissent]. 
1. Effective immediately, . • . it is further ORDERED that [a named class of 
defendants] ••• and any other persons to whom notice or knowledge of this Order 
may come, shall not in any way interfere with, molest, threaten, intimidate, or coerce 
any persons of the Negro race with the purpose of interfering with such person's 
right to seek . • • accommodations. 
Principal case at 587-88. 
2. While a Negro was being served in a restaurant Lance commented in a loud 
voice, "You know I have to protect these black sons of bitches." The next day the 
Negro attempted to register in the adjoining motel, and on his departure Lance 
threateningly followed him around the city in his automobile. Principal case at 588-89. 
3. Within twenty days of this order, he shall submit a verified report to this 
Court that lie has resigned his position as deputy sheriff of St. Johns County, 
Florida, and surrendered his badge and other incidents of office and of police 
equipment to his superiors; and that he shall no longer act under any color, guise, 
or pretense of a law enforcement or peace officer. 
Principal case at 590. 
4. [S]ince sanctions imposed in civil contempt proceedings must always give to 
the alleged contemnor the opportunity to bring himself into compliance, the 
sanction cannot be one that does not come to an end when he repents his past 
conduct and purges himself. 
Principal case at 592. 
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petition for a writ of certiorari, Justices Black and Harlan dissenting 
in written opinions. 
Appellant's initial objection to the contempt decree was that the 
district court lacked jurisdiction over him because he had not been a 
party to the injunction proceedings. At first glance this contention 
seems quite valid, for there is authority to the effect that an injunc-
tion can bind only those who are parties to the action in which the 
injunction is issued.5 Indeed, Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides that an injunction is binding only "upon 
the parties to the action." However, Rule 65(d) also provides that 
an injunction is binding on "those persons in active concert or par-
ticipation with [the parties] ... who receive actual notice of the 
order by personal service or otherwise."6 In the principal case, the 
district court attempted to sustain jurisdiction simply on the basis of 
appellant's knowledge of the injunctive order,7 but the court of " 
appeals found ample evidence within the findings of the district 
court to establish that appellant was acting in concert with the en-
joined parties.8 Thus, the Fifth Circuit Court was legitimately able 
to sustain the exercise of jurisdiction over appellant even though he 
was not a party to the injunction proceeding.9 
Of far greater importance than the jurisdictional question, how-
ever, is the court's decree ordering appellant to resign from public 
office. Such a decree appears to be unprecedented and is a significant 
expansion of the contempt power of the federal courts. As Mr. 
Justice Black pointed out in his dissenting opinion to the Court's 
5. Swetland v. Curry, 188 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1951); accord, Kean v. Hurley, 179 
F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1950); Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930); see 
3 BARRON 8: HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1437 (1958). It follows that 
the provision of the injunctive order in the principal case which attempted to bind 
all persons with knowledge of that order had no legal force. Chase Nat'l. Bank v. 
Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 437 (1934); accord, NLRB v. Birdsall-Stockdale Motor Co., 208 
F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1953); Chisolm v. Caines, 147 F. Supp. 188 (E.D.S.C., 1954); cf. 
Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945). 
There is some earlier authority to the effect that any person knowing of an 
injunction and in violation of it can be found guilty of contempt, even if he is not 
named in the injunctive order. These cases have probably been overruled by implica-
tion, Swetland v. Curry, supra at 843; Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, supra at 833, but, 
assuming arguendo that they are still good law, they apparently allow only criminal, 
and not civil, contempt actions, Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 112 (1922); 
accord, In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548, 554 (1897); Chisolm v. Caines, 121 Fed. 397 (C.C.D. 
S.C. 1903); In re Reese, 107 Fed. 942 (8th Cir. 1901). See generally Moskovitz, Con-
tempt of Injunction, Civil and Criminal, 43 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 780, 813-14 (1943). 
6. Fro. R. CIV. P. 65(d). 
7. Principal case at 590. 
8. On each occasion, when the Negro appeared to assert his rights, appellant also 
appeared, and the trial court found, that he was acting in response to signals from the 
motel manager. Principal case at 588. 
9. Principal case at 591. Mr. Justice Black seems to have overlooked this shift of 
jurisdictional basis, for he states: "There was no finding below that Lance was in any 
way an agent or was acting in concert with any of the defendants who were ordered 
not to intimidate or coerce Negroes." Black's dissent at 930 n.l. 
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refusal to grant a writ of certiorari, such an expansion, with its 
potentially dangerous impact on the rights of individual public 
officials and on the federal system of checks and balances, should not 
be permitted to stand unless the Supreme Court first reviews the 
expansion and defines its scope.10 
First of all, as Mr. Justice Black noted, the decision in the 
principal case raises serious constitutional questions, for it extends 
the equity powers of the federal courts into an area in which the 
federal courts generally have not interfered. Federal courts sitting 
in equity have traditionally declined to remove state officials,11 and 
even, in certain situations, federal administrative officials,12 regard-
less of the seriousness of their misconduct. This is because removal 
of officials has been considered a matter within the realm of political 
action, a realm into which the federal courts should not enter out 
" of respect for the other branches of govemment.13 In dealing with 
• the reapportionment problem, the Supreme Court, in order to in-
sure that constitutional requirements of representative government 
are not abused, seems to have modified this phase of the political 
question doctrine so as to allow judicial inquiry into the legislative 
branch of govemment.14 However, in Baker v. Carr, the Court ex-
plicitly declined to overrule the doctrine that a federal court in 
equity should not interfere with the appointment or removal process 
itself.15 Since the court in the principal case forced appellant to 
resign his position, its decree would appear to be inconsistent with 
this line of authority. 
Moreover, federal courts have been reluctant to interfere with 
10. This examination of the principal case will not attempt to deal with the prob-
lem of classifying this as a civil, rather than criminal, contempt action. Notice, how-
ever, that since one of the principal factors used by a lower court in classifying a 
given action is the nature of the relief asked, Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590 
(1947), the plaintiff himself makes the initial determination whether the action will 
be treated as civil or criminal contempt. In the principal case, the action was brought 
as one for civil contempt probably because of a provision in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, tit. XI, § 1101, 78 Stat. 268, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(h) (1964), requiring jury trial in 
criminal contempt actions arising under the Act and preserving summary non-jury 
proceedings in civil contempt actions. 
Moreover, a trial court's classification of a given action appears to be conclusive, 
and not subject to adequate review, due to the line of authority holding that "it is the 
purpose of the punishment, rather than the character of the act punished, which 
determines whether the proceeding is for civil or criminal contempt." Lamb v. Cramer, 
285 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1932); accord, Go:npers v. Bucks Stove &: Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 
(1911). This practice is criticized in Moskovitz, supra note 5. For a more compre-
hensive treatment of the whole problem of classification, see generally GOLDFARB, THE 
CONTEMPT POWER 49-67 (1963); Comment, The Coercive Function of Civil Contempt, 
33 U. CHI. L. REv. 120 (1965). 
11. Walton v. House of Representatives of Oklahoma, 265 U.S. 487 (1924): accord, 
Taylor v. Beckham (No. 1), 178 U.S. 548 (1900); In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888): see 
cases cited Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 558 (1954). 
12. White v. Berry, 171 U.S. 366 (1898). 
13. See cases cited note 11 supra. 
14. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
15. Id. at 231. 
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state governmental operations because of our federalist structure of 
government.16 To be sure, the fourteenth amendment prohibits 
state action which abridges the privileges and immunities of Ameri-
can citizenship, and this has been construed to mean that the federal 
courts have jurisdiction over states' agents and officials,17 the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity of the states notwithstanding.18 Under 
this constitutional provision, Congress has authorized the bringing 
of civil suits against state government officials who deprive citizens 
of their privileges and immunities,19 as well as the imposition 
of criminal fines and federal imprisonment for violations of the 
fourteenth amendment prohibitions.20 Even in the absence of specific 
legislative authorization, the courts, in order to preserve fourteenth 
amendment rights, have employed their powers at law or in equity: 
enjoining state officials from taking certain actions;21 overturning 
state action already taken;22 and enjoining court proceedings in some 
instances.23 But Congress has never authorized the removal of state 
officials from their offices, and the courts have never before done so 
on their own initiative. It might be argued that the difference be-
tween imprisoning a police officer and compelling him to resign is 
insignificant, for in either situation, by rendering the officer totally 
unavailable to act for the state, the courts interfere with state ex-
ercise of its police power. Yet the difference in form is not so insig-
nificant as it may seem. Congress has prescribed the sanction of im-
prisonment for certain illegal actions, whereas it has not authorized 
this additional sanction of removal from office. Furthermore, in the 
interest of maintaining our system of federalism, the federal govern-
ment has sought to limit its interference in state affairs as much as 
possible;24 actually removing a state official from his position may 
certainly be deemed interference, and in the principal case, it was 
16. Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379, 392 (1931); accord, Metcalf 
8e Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
lH6 (1819). 
17. Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 100 (1951); accord, Ex parte Virginia, 
100 U.S. 339 (1880). 
18. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); accord, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 
123 (1908). 
19. REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 
(1961). 
20. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). 
21. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); accord, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 
123 (1908). But see Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944). See 
generally Isseks, Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts To Enjoin Unauthorized 
Action of State Officials, 40 HARV. L. REv. 969 (1927). 
22. E.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
23. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939). But see Douglas v. City 
of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). See generally Taylor & Willis, The Power of Federal 
Courts To Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 YALE L.J. 1169 (1933). 
24. "[E]ach government, in order that it may administer its affairs within its own 
sphere, must be left free from undue interference by the other." Metcalf &: Eddy 
v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926); accord, Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 
379, 392 (1931); cf. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905). 
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not demonstrated that such interference was necessary.25 Finally, 
the extent of this new remedy pattern is undefined, something which 
is not true with respect to the older remedies, since a considerable 
body of law has been developed to prevent their abusive use.26 
In addition to its potentially adverse impact on federal-state rela-
tions, the decision in the principal case presents difficulties insofar 
as the court has gone beyond the traditional sanctions imposed for 
civil contempt without a showing that these sanctions were inade-
quate, with the result that the court has seriously impinged upon 
the rights of the individual involved. One of the principal functions 
of a civil contempt decree is to compel compliance with a prior 
court order.27 The courts will normally insure such compliance by 
one of the following: im,prisoning the contemner until he has 
demonstrated a willingness to comply;28 ordering the contemner to 
publish notice to the injured party, the general public, or both that 
he has been found guilty of contempt of court but that he will 
comply with the court order in the future;29 or by threatening the 
contemner with heavy economic sanctions if he should again fail to 
comply.30 It may be significant that the court in the principal case 
did not indicate why any one of these sanctions could not have been 
effectively used in this situation. 
To be sure, there is authority which indicates that in contempt 
actions a court may use whatever power is necessary,31 but while 
25. And no one claims that this new federal judge power to remove state officers 
is necessary to enforce the salutary provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
It is clear that the judge's order here provides complete protection to the plain-
tiff's rights withou~ that part compelling the State's deputy sheriff to hold his 
job at the pleasure of the United States judges. 
Black's dissent at 932. 
26. See generally KAUPER, PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS: FLUID CONCEPTS IN 
CIVIL LmERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1962); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 
COLUM. L. REv. 1083 (1960). 
27. Bessette v. W. B. Conkley Co., 194 U.S. 324, 328 (1904); see 17 AM. JuR. 2D 
Contempt § 105 (1964) and cases cited therein. The other primary function is to 
provide a remedy specifically for a party who may or has suffered damages as a conse-
quence of the contempt. Thus, in the principal case, appellant was also required 
to pay a small compensatory fee to the complaining party. Principal case at 590. 
28. Release is contingent upon compliance with the previously violated order, and 
thus it is often said that contemners "carry the keys of their prison in their own 
pockets." In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902). For a criticism of this indefinite 
imprisonment, see generally Politano v. Politano, 146 Misc. 792, 262 N.Y. Supp. 802 
(Sup. Ct. 1933); Goldfarb, The Constitution and Contempt of Court, 61 MICH, L. !\EV· 
283 (1962); Comment, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 120 (1965). 
29. NLRB v. Vander Wal, 316 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1963); West Texas Util. Co. v. 
NLRB, 206 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 855 (1953). 
30. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) ($2,800,000 conditional fine): 
Meredith v. Fair, 313 F.2d 532 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. ·915 (1962) (conditional 
fine of $10,000 per day levied on Gov. Ross Barnett of Mississippi). 
31. "The measure of the court's power in civil contempt proceedings is determined 
by the requirements of full remedial relief. They may entail the doing of various 
acts •.•• " McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 193 (1949); accord, NLRB 
v. Vander Wal, 316 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1963). 
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these cases seem to lend some legitimacy to the court's action, they 
are distinguishable since they involve the power of a court to com-
pensate fully the victim of the contemptuous act, rather than the 
power to coerce compliance with an injunctive order, as in the 
principal case.82 The argument that contempt power should be 
treated as sui generis is of no greater support;33 this is merely a way 
to avoid having to face the difficult question of how much contempt 
power a judge ought to have and how he ought to use it. If the office 
appellant was forced to resign was the principal source of his liveli-
hood rather than merely a volunteer part-time position, the decree 
would seem rather harsh indeed, and yet the court has made no 
effort to restrict its future use of the power to force resignations. 
Moreover, there may be some question whether the sanction im-
posed by the court in the principal case is as effective as are the tra-
ditional sanctions. While the court's action will prevent appellant 
from intimidating Negroes by "riding his badge" again, it would 
seem that a jail sentence or heavy economic sanction is more apt to 
prevent or discourage appellant from further contemptuous acts. 
Finally, one must consider that in indirect contempt actions-
actions arising from conduct outside the presence of the court-a 
judge must necessarily rely on the testimony of the litigants or other 
witnesses.84 Yet all civil contempt actions, including indirect con-
tempts, are normally heard in summary proceedings in which plead-
ing rules, procedural formalities, and even rules of evidence are 
suspended.35 In such proceedings, the rights of an accused contemner 
are dangerously curtailed; hence any expansion of the power avail-
able to a judge in these proceedings, such as is represented by the 
decree rendered in the principal case, would appear to be unwise.36 
Similarly, the right to jury trial occupies an important place in our 
constitutional heritage, and as long as this right is denied to con-
temners,37 the power which a judge may wield ought to be carefully 
32. In McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., supra note 31, appellee violated an 
injunctive order regarding minimum wage restrictions, and was ordered to give 
employees back pay in accordance with a prescribed formula. In NLRB v. Vander Wal, 
supra note 31, the ccurt ordered appellee to pay legal fees, court costs, and all other 
expenses caused by his refusal to arbitrate grievances. 
33. Black.mer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 440 (1932); accord, Bessette v. W. B. 
Conkley Co., 194 U.S. 324, 326 (1904). 
34. See GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER ch. 1 (1963). This is in contrast to direct 
contempt actions which arise out of acts committed within the presence of the court. 
35. See Sacher v. United State:;, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952). A summary proceeding was 
used at the trial of appellant in the principal case. Black's dissent at 931. 
36. See SWAYZEE, CONTEMPT OF COURT IN LABOR INJUNCTION CAsEs (1935); Goldfarb, 
The Constitution and Contempt of Court, 61 MICH, L. REv. 283 (1962); cf. Sacher v. 
United States, 343 U.S. 1, 14 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). 
37. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964). Although the case is distinguish-
able by virtue of being a criminal, rather than civil, contempt action, the denial of 
the right to a jury trial probably applies equally to civil contempt cases, since the 
argument in favor of that right ought to be stronger in the criminal contempt context. 
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circumscribed rather than expanded.38 Not surprisingly, in an earlier 
decision, Mr. Justice Black discerned "a congressional plan to limit 
the contempt power to 'the least possible power adequate to the end 
proposed,' "39 and another federal judge has urged that "the grant of 
summary contempt power ... is to be grudgingly construed [and] 
... restricted to the bedrock cases .... "40 The principal case runs 
directly counter to these policies.41 
Despite the objections discussed above, one may argue that there 
were some utilitarian reasons for having fashioned this strong sanc-
tion. The situation in St. Augustine was explosive, with tempers 
high and racial sensitivity keen. Faced with a contemptuous act, the 
court may have found its action necessary in order to show un-
equivocally to the contemner and others who shared his views that 
it would not sit by idly and let its orders be violated. However, it 
does appear in retrospect that such an unprecedented sanction would 
not have been necessary. A judge would only have needed to demon-
strate that he would act rapidly and directly to curb contemptuous 
acts, and this could have been accomplished without exceeding the 
scope of the traditional contempt remedies. 
Thus, the court could have and should have restricted itself to 
the use of one of the traditional sanctions, and in the event that they 
proved to be insufficient to coerce general compliance, then a crim-
inal contempt action should have been the next step, complete with 
jury trial as guaranteed in the 1964 Civil Rights Act.42 Congress ap-
parently intended that criminal contempt actions be used in extreme 
cases, or its inclusion of this provision in the Act was mere sur-
38. Mr. Justice Goldberg dissented from the Barnett opinion, arguing that since 
the decrees rendered in contempt actions are more severe now than they were at the 
time the Constitution was written, the right to a jury trial ought to be extended to 
contemners. United States v. Barnett, supra note 37, at 728. See also Green v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); Goldfarb, The Constitution and 
Contempt of Court, 61 MICH. L. R.Ev. 283 (1962). 
39. Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 404 (1956), citing Anderson v. Dunn, 
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821); accord, Ballantyne v. United States, 237 F.2d 657, 667 
(5th Cir. 1965); cf. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 167 (1963). 
40. Farese v. United States, 209 F.2d 312, 315 (1st Cir. 1954). 
41. Although summary contempt proceedings have long been employed in direct 
contempt actions, their application to indirect contempt actions dates from a 1765 
case in which Judge Wilmot utilized them, for political reasons, by distorting prior 
authority to rationalize his actions. Blackstone accepted Judge Wilmot's interpretation 
of the cases and incorporated it into his Commentaries. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
•282-83. This is apparently the origin of the American application of summary pro• 
ceedings to indirect contempts. See generally GOLDFARB, THE CONTE!\l:PT POWER ch. 1 
(1963); Fox, The King v. Almon. (pts. 1 &: 2), 24 L.Q. R.Ev. 184, 266 (1908); Fox, The 
Summary Process to Punish Contempt. (pts. 1 &: 2), 25 L.Q. R.Ev. 238, 354 (1909). 
Mr. Justice Black rested on his belief that Blackstone was in error as one basis for arguing 
that the law of contempt should be changed, Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 
193 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting), but without success, for the American practice has 
become firmly established. 
42. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. XI, § 1101, 78 Stat. 268, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(h) 
(1964). 
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plusage. It is unfortunate that the federal courts chose instead to 
expand the power and discretion available to a judge in a summary 
civil contempt proceeding, and to do so in a manner which is 
subject to criticism on so many different grounds. It is equally un-
fortunate that the Supreme Court permitted such a decree to stand 
without review. 43 
43. "I regret that the Court refuses to review this case in order to make it clear 
to all the people just how far this new contempt power of federal judges goes." 
Black's dissent at 982. 
